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From Really Being to Being
Represented





1 This paper is addressed to scholars (among which I include myself) unfamiliar with
Peirce’s thought as a whole and aims at reaffirming that his entire philosophy shall be
conceived as an integrated (yet fragmentary) system, a characteristic which has often
been  shrugged  aside  in  unsuspecting  disciplines  (e.g. language,  media,  or  literary
studies). For instance, as far as semiotics is concerned, I gradually came to realize, with
Short  (2007:  ix),  that  “Peirce’s  theory  of  signs  [has  indeed  been]  taken  up  by  an
interdisciplinary  army  of  ‘semioticians’  whose  views  and  aims  are  antithetical  to
Peirce’s  own,  and meanwhile […] has been shunned by those philosophers who are
working  in  Peirce’s  own  spirit  on  the  very  problems  to  which  his  semeiotic  was
addressed.” This often led many works, among them introductory monographs about
signs  in  general,  to  focus  on  specific  parts  unfortunately  severed  from  the  whole,
leaving  those  amputated  fragments  at  best  difficult  to  understand  or  at  worst
desperately meaningless. 
2 Within this  perspective,  I  will  strive to provide a  “synoptic” overview of  Peirce’s  “
pragmaticist” doctrine of the truth of propositions. Two reasons have led to this choice
of topic. The first is that Peirce’s perspective on propositions, I believe, is a good way of
illustrating  the  fundamental  interrelations  between  his  metaphysical,
phenomenological,  and semeiological  views.  The second reason is  I  think this  topic
constitutes  a  good  entry  point  to  reflect  upon  Peirce’s  pragmaticist  approach  as  a
whole. In order to do so, I will mostly rely on Peirce’s own writings, as I came to believe
that  no  one  was  as  incisive  as  Peirce  himself,  provided  each  of  his  thoughts  are
repositioned on the chronological line of his intellectual development. Indeed, as Max
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Fisch (1986) and others have shown (see, in particular, Murphey 1961; Freadman 2004;
Short 2007; Bergman 2009b; and Bellucci 2018), Peirce’s views did greatly evolve over
time, but that envisioned “philosophical edifice” was already there in the making, as a
guiding principle governing all his work. 
3 In the first place, I will thus briefly present Peirce’s fundamental “conceptions,” which
are central  to his  philosophical  system, irrigating all  of  its  branches.  In the second
place, I will survey Peirce’s “Kantian step” of transferring those conceptions of logic to
metaphysics, yielding three kinds of “real elements” whose respective characters are
quite distinct. In the third place, I will describe how those three kinds of realities must
necessarily be implied in a pragmaticist approach of true propositions, understood as
final beliefs to which inquiries carried sufficiently far are ultimately destined to lead.
 
1. Toward the Kantian Step
4 In  the  famous Guess  at  the  Riddle  essay,  written  in  the  winter  of  1887-1888,  Peirce
declared that his ambition was “to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to
say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work
of  human  reason,  in  philosophy  of  every  school  and  kind,  in  mathematics,  in
psychology,  in  physical  science,  in  history,  in  sociology,  and  in  whatever  other
department  there  may  be,  shall  appear  as  the  filling  up  of  its  details”  (W6:  168
[1887-88]). More specifically, he insisted that “to erect a philosophical edifice that shall
outlast the vicissitudes of time, my care must be, not so much to set each brick with
nicest  accuracy,  as  to  lay  the  foundations  deep  and  massive,”  and  argued  in
consequence  that  the  first  step  toward  the  foundational  building  of  a  systematic
philosophy  was  to  find  “simple  concepts  applicable  to  every  subject”  (W6:  169
[1887-88]). 
5 In  the  New  List  of  Categories,  published  twenty  years  earlier,  Peirce  had  actually
presented such a list of conceptions, or categories, understood as “the fundamental ones
of at least one universal science, that of logic” (W2: 56 [1868]), and which he formally
deduced  from  a  formal  analysis  of  the  structure  of  propositions.1 However,  Peirce
repeatedly conceded that his conceptions, which “meet us not once but at every turn”
(W6:  182  [1887-88]),  were  rather  “vague  ideas.”  For  instance,  in  his  Architecture  of
Theories,  published  in  an  1891  issue  of  the  Monist,  he  admitted  that  “they  are
conceptions so very broad and consequently indefinite that they are hard to seize and
may  be  easily  overlooked”  (W8:  109  [1891]).  In  the  same  vein,  in  his  second  1898
Cambridge lecture, he argued that it was “to be remembered that they are excessively
general ideas, so very uncommonly general that it is far from easy to get any but a
vague apprehension of their meaning” (CP 4.3. [1898]); and in a 1903 letter to William
James, he confessed also that “to make them as distinct as it is in their nature to be is,
however, no small task. I do not suppose they are so in my own mind; and evidently, it
is not in their nature to be sharp as ordinary concepts” (CP 8.264 [1903]).
6 More precisely, Peirce conceived these fundamental conceptions to be “no more than
the ideas of First, Second, and Third, – ideas so broad that they may be looked upon
rather as moods or tones of  thought,  than as definite notions” (W6: 169 [1887-88]).
What is more, he emphasized that “if  there are any three-fold distinctions that are
more than verbal, their real nature will clearly be elucidated by an understanding of
the  meanings  of  the  numbers  one,  two,  three,  provided  that  there  are  any  such
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meanings” (ibid.: 170). Now, in the most abstract of form, according to Peirce, third is
the conception of that which is related to two other things, in such wise that it brings
them into relation (because we cannot  conceive anything third without  necessarily
conceiving  something  first  and  something  second:  third  implies  first  and  second);
second is the conception of that which is related to something else, but regardless of any
third  thing  bringing  them  into  relation  (because  we  may  not  conceive  something
second without necessarily conceiving something first, but we may conceive something
second without necessarily conceiving anything third: second implies first but does not
imply  third);  and first  is  the  conception of  that  which is  unrelated to  nothing else
(because we may conceive something first without necessarily conceiving something
second nor something third: first does not imply second nor third). 
7 Those three irreducible categories being vague and hardly definable, I propose to take
“the Kantian step of transferring the conceptions of logic to metaphysics” (R 439: 1
[1898]) and examine their application to the “real world.” Peirce argued indeed that the
three categories of logic “should be the three elementary conceptions of metaphysics”
on the ground that “Nature only appears intelligible so far as it appears rational, that
is, so far as its processes are seen to be like processes of thought” (CP 3.422 [1892]).
Such a metaphysical point of view, I believe, shall help us understand even more clearly
“what are the kinds of objects that are first, second, and third, not as being so counted,
but in their own true characters” (W6: 170 [1887-88]). For three fundamental categories
of characters, or “modes of being,” may indeed be deduced from what was stated above:
firstness, secondness, and thirdness. Firstness is the mode of being of that which is first, or
that which is such as it is, in being unrelated to nothing else; secondness is the mode of
being of that which is second, or that which is such as it is, in being related to something
else but regardless of anything else; and thirdness is the mode of being of that which is
third, or that which is such as it is, in bringing two other things into relation. Let us
now see how the categories enter into real elements. 
 
2. Possible Qualities, Actual Existents, and General
Laws
8 One of Peirce’s original contributions to philosophy consists in a passionate defense of
his  own version of  scholastic  realism (see,  for  instance,  Boler  1963;  Engel-Tiercelin
1992; and Lane 2018), whereby he contended that the real, understood as that which is
such as it is independently of its being so represented,2 was not to be reduced to mere
existence. 
9 This,  however, contradicted a seminal tenet of nominalism, “this stupid and utterly
anti-scientific  doctrine”  (R  778:  12  [ca.  1909]).  According  to  Peirce  indeed,  the
nominalists “hold that existence, – the reaction of things against the other things of the
universe, – is the only mode of real being while the Scotists, like Aristotle and Plato,
held  that  besides  the  existent realities  there  are  higher  kinds  of  reality;  laws that
regulate the universe though they cannot be said to exist, as well as potentialities or
germs of being not yet developed into actual existence”3 (R 778: 12 [ca. 1909]). As a
matter  of  fact,  an  important  evolution  of  Peirce’s  thought,  spanning  almost  thirty
years,  consisted in this  gradual  recognition of  those three “independent or distinct
elements  of  the  triune  Reality”  (EP2:  345  [1904]),  which  any  serious  philosophical
system shall recognize as its ingredients: possible qualities, actual facts, and general laws.
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This, for instance, led him to suggest a division of the most important metaphysical
systems having emerged in the history of philosophy “based upon the consideration of
what ones of the three categories each of the different metaphysical systems has fully
admitted as real constituents of nature” (EP2: 179 [1903]). 
 
2.1. Possible Qualities are Real 
10 The first category comprises all qualities, which may be conceived as firsts, being such as
they are, regardless of anything else. Indeed, “a quality is whatever it is in itself. It has
such mode of being as it has independently of any other quality, of existing in any
subject, and of being represented” (R 8: 1 [ca. 1904?]. It follows that any given quality,
because it is such as it is in itself and would so remain even if it never were never
embodied in anything, is in some sense eternal: “a pure quality, in its mode of being as a
pure quality, does not cease to be because it is not embodied in anything” (R 7: 12 [ca.
1903?]). Said Peirce, in the 1903 Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic: “look at anything red.
That redness is positively what it is. Contrast may heighten our consciousness of it; but
the redness is not relative to anything; it is absolute, or positive. If one imagines or
remembers red, his imagination will be either vivid or dim; but that will not, in the
least, affect the quality of the redness, which may be brilliant or dull, in either case.
The vividness is the degree of our consciousness of it, its reaction on us. The quality in
itself has no vividness or dimness” (EP2: 268 [1903]). Accordingly, “it seems undeniable
that there really are such possibilities, and that, though they are not existences, they
are not nothing” (EP2: 269 [1903]).4
11 From a phenomenological point of view, we are conscious of qualities whenever we
happen to feel anything: “Imagine me to make and in a slumberous condition to have a
vague, unobjectified, still unsubjectified, sense of redness, or of salt taste, or of an ache,
or of grief or joy, or of a prolonged musical note. That would be, as nearly as possible, a
purely monadic state of feeling. Now in order to convert that psychological or logical
conception into a metaphysical one, we must think of a metaphysical monad as a pure
nature, or quality, in itself without parts or features, and without embodiment” (CP
1.303 [1894]). As a matter of fact, artists are particularly attuned to that state of mind
which consists in contemplating “what stares one in the face, just as it presents itself”
(EP2: 147 [1903]). For instance, “when the ground is covered by snow on which the sun
shines brightly except where shadows fall, if you ask any ordinary man what its color
appears to be, he will tell you white, pure white, whiter in the sunlight, a little greyish
in the shadow. But that is not what is before his eyes that he is describing; it is his
theory of what ought to be seen. The artist [however] will tell him that the shadows are
not grey but a dull blue and that the snow in the sunshine is of a rich yellow.” In any
case, thus, “whenever we are awake, something is present to the mind, and what is
present, without reference to any compulsion or reason, is feeling” (EP2: 4 [1894]). Our
feelings, therefore, testify to the reality of possible qualities.
 
2.2. Actual Existents are Real 
12 The second category of real elements comprises all existents, which may be conceived as
seconds, being such as they are, related to something else, but regardless of anything
else. Using the word “in its strict philosophical sense” (CP. 6.495 [1906]), Peirce thus
argued that “the existent is that which reacts against other things” (CP 8.191 [1903]) in
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pairs, and that “what is meant by Existence consists in each existent reacting […] with
all the other existents of the same universe” (R 939: 35 [1905]) – a mode of being that a
mere quality is incapable of enjoying. For instance, “to say there is a phantom table […]
incapable of affecting any senses or of producing any physical effects whatever, is to
speak of an imaginary table. A thing without oppositions ipso facto does not exist. […]
Not only is this opposition essential to an individual thing or subject, but also to an
individual fact. Its truth, or existence, is the sum of its effects” (CP 1.457 [ca. 1896]).
Remember  that  this  mode  of  being  was  the  only one  conceived  to  be  real  by  the
nominalists: for “the heart of the dispute lies in this. The modern philosophers – one
and all, unless Schelling be an exception – recognize but one mode of being, the being
of an individual thing or fact, the being which consists in the object’s crowding out a
place for itself in the universe, so to speak, and reacting by brute force of fact, against 
all other things” (CP 1.21 [1903]).
13 Hence, the mode of being of an existent thing does not consist in a mere possibility, like
that of pure qualities, but in its brute actuality: its being, therefore, “does not consist in
any qualities, but in its effects – in its actually acting and being acted on, so long as this
action and suffering endures. Those who experience its effects perceive and know it in
that action; and just that constitutes its very being. It is not in perceiving its qualities
that they know it, but in hefting its insistency then and there, which Duns called its
haecceitas”5 (CP 6.318 [ca. 1909]). However, “if all its qualities were to be taken away,
and it were to be left quality-less matter, it not only would not exist, but it would not
have any positive definite possibility – such as an unembodied quality has. It would be
nothing at all” (CP 1.527 [1903]). Existents, therefore, may not be prescinded6 from the
qualities which they embody, although those embodied qualities may be prescinded
from them.
14 More specifically, an existent is to be conceived as the subject of an actual fact, which
may be of two possible kinds: (1) “monadic” facts, which consist in its embodying some
possible quality and (2) “dyadic” facts, which consist in its standing in a relation with
some other existent. Dyadic facts may themselves be divided into two possible kinds:
first, those which consist, for their subject, in its being qualitatively related to another
existent by virtue of a quality which they would both happen to possess, and those
which consist, for their subject, in its being dynamically related to another existent by
virtue of acting on, or of being acted upon by, the other. In that latter case, the reaction
necessarily determines a quality which would otherwise not be there in one or both of
the related existents: any dynamic relation necessarily produces an effect. 
15 From a phenomenological point of view, we are conscious of actual existents whenever
we happen to react with anything forcing itself upon ourselves: “this sense of acting
and of being acted upon, which is our sense of the reality of [existent] things, – both of
outward and of ourselves, – may be called the sense of Reaction. It does not reside in
any one Feeling; it comes upon the breaking of one feeling by another feeling” (EP2: 4
[1894]). In other words, a reaction is “that which we experience when our will meets
with resistance, or when something obtrudes itself upon sense” (R 439: 6 [1898]). That
which brutely reacts against us, therefore, is an insistent other, a non-ego which resists
to its  being modified,  and this very reluctance is  what distinguishes existents from
mere fancies of the mind which “yield at once to a direct effort of the will”7 (EP2: 65
[1901]). This definition corresponds to what we generally call experience, as being that
which brutely forces itself upon us in the course of life. Note also that actual existents
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conceived as being perceived are called percepts and constitute, as such, the bedrocks of
perceptual facts. The latter, as I mentioned, may either be “monadic” or “dyadic,” for
something may immediately, or directly, be perceived as embodying a quality or as
reacting against another thing. Our senses of reaction, therefore, testify to the reality
of actual existents.
 
2.3. General Laws are Real
16 The third category comprises all laws, which may be conceived as thirds, being such as
they are in bringing qualities and existents into relation. Peirce remarked indeed that
“nobody can doubt that we know laws upon which we can base predictions to which
actual events still in the womb of the future will conform to a marked extent, if not
perfectly. To deny reality to such laws is to quibble about words” (EP2: 269 [1903]). For
instance,  it  is  a  given  truism  that  “with  overwhelming  uniformity,  in  our  past
experience, direct and indirect, stones left free to fall have fallen” (EP2: 183 [1903]). In
order to make sense of this, however, “two hypotheses only are open to us. Either: first,
the uniformity with which those stones have fallen has been due to mere chance and
affords no ground whatever, not the slightest, for any expectation that the next stone
that shall be let go will fall; or, second, the uniformity with which stones have fallen
has been due to some active general principle,  in which case it  would be a strange
coincidence that it should cease to act at the moment my prediction was based upon it”
(ibid.). Of course, as the realist he was, Peirce opted for the second hypothesis. 
17 Accordingly, the 1903 Syllabus stated that if “there be a regularity that never will be and
never  would  be  broken,  that  has  a  mode  of  being  consisting  in  this  destiny  or
determination of the nature of things that the endless future shall conform to it, that is
what we call a law. Whether any such law be discoverable or not, it is certain we have
the idea of such a thing, and should there be such a law, it would evidently have a
reality, consisting in the fact that predictions based on it would be borne out by actual
events”8 (EP2: 269 [1903]). More specifically, a general law, the instantiation of which
applies  to  actual  existents  whenever  corresponding  conditional  events  are  actually
fulfilled, is therefore expressible in a general conditional proposition of the form “if…,
then…,”9 and  is  to  be  conceived  as  expressing  a  consequence,  or  general  relation
subsisting between an antecedent general fact as cause and its consequent general fact as
effect.  The  mode  of  being  of  laws,  therefore,  consists  in  their  general  power  of
government,  applicable  to  an  infinite collection of  occasions  even  if those  occasions
never actually get to occur.
18 From a phenomenological point of view, we are conscious of laws whenever we happen
to  reason  in  thoughts,  that  is,  go  through  an  intellectual  process  “by  which  a
phenomenon is  found to be governed by a rule,  or  has a  general  knowable way of
behaving” (EP2: 5 [1894]). Hence, the law according to which dropped stones would fall,
for instance, is not immediately apprehended in consciousness, as feelings or actual
existents may be apprehended: a law is indeed necessarily thought, that is, represented. 
However,  the  fact  that  any  good  law  is  a  represented law,  or  is  dependent  upon
representation, does not in the least imply that it cannot be real. In a famous passage of
his fourth 1903 Harvard Lecture, which I reproduce here in full because of its clarity,
Peirce thus argued that “the general proposition that all solid bodies fall in the absence
of  any  upward  forces  or  pressure,  this  formula,  I  say,  is  of  the  nature  of  a
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representation. Our nominalistic friends would be the last to dispute that. They will go
so far as to say that it is a mere representation, – the word mere meaning that to be
represented and really to be are two very different things; and that this formula has no
being except as being represented. It certainly is of the nature of a representation. That
is undeniable, I grant. And it is equally undeniable that that which is of the nature of a
representation is not ipso facto real. In that respect there is a great contrast between an
object of reaction [i.e. an actual existent] and an object of representation. Whatever
reacts IS ipso facto real. But an object of representation is not ipso facto real. If I were to
predict that on my letting go of the stone it would fly up in the air, that would be mere
fiction; and the proof that it was so would be obtained by simply trying the experiment.
That is clear. On the other hand, and by the same token, the fact that I know that this
stone  will  fall  to  the floor  when  I  let  it  go  […]  is  the  proof  that  the  formula,  or
uniformity,  as  furnishing  a  safe  basis  for  prediction,  is,  or  if  you  like  it  better,
corresponds to, a reality” (EP2: 181 [1903]). 
19 In other words, provided it is truly represented, a given law, in so far as it would bring
about the predictions which it  conditionally implies,  cannot be conceived as a mere
formula, or representation: it may be just as real.10 It follows that a general law “that
consists in the fact that the subject of it would, under certain conditions, behave in a
certain way, is Real, provided this be true whether actual persons think so or not; and it
must be admitted to be a Real Habit, even if those conditions never actually do get
fulfilled” (EP2: 457 [1909]). 
20 Note that, as a matter of fact, it is precisely because we know that some determinate
effect would ensue,  provided conditional  events are fulfilled,  that we are capable of
purposive action.  For  instance,  our  knowing  that  a  bullet  shot  at  someone  would
necessarily kill that person is a necessary prerequisite for our really killing someone on
purpose, provided we actually shoot a bullet.  Conversely,  we also know that no one
could be killed in such a manner if no bullet is actually shot, i.e. if the law’s conditional
events are not actually fulfilled for it to instantiate itself. Our reasonings, therefore, and
the  rightful  predictions  which  they  allowed  us  to  foresee,  testify  to  the  reality  of
general laws.
 
2.4. A Triune Reality of Firsts, Seconds, and Thirds
21 Peirce’s  categorial  scheme thus provided him with a logical  apparatus for deducing
three  fundamental  kinds  of  real  elements:  possible  qualities,  actual  existents,  and
general laws. Qualities, as firsts, may be prescinded from existents, which existents (and
their facts), as seconds, may be prescinded from laws, as thirds. Laws, on their side, are
unprescindible from either two, just as existents are unprescindible from qualities. In
the draft of an unpublished paper, On the Logic of  Quantity,  probably written around
1895, Peirce summarized his metaphysical doctrine in the following terms: “We remark
in the world three categories of elements. The first comprises the qualities, such as red,
butter, tedious, hard, heart-rending, agreeable, and doubtless manifold varieties which
are utterly unknown to us.  They are potentialities and general  in their  nature,  but
there is no reason why any of them should be as it is. The second category comprises
actual  occurrences.  They  are  individual  and  brutely  insistent.  The  third  category
comprises laws. No fact nor collection of facts can constitute a law which goes beyond
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any completed facts  to  determine how facts  that  may be shall  be characterized.  In
these, the ideal world of qualities and the world of facts overlap” (R 13: 4 [ca. 1895]). 
22 In  metaphysics,  therefore,  firstness,  secondness,  and  thirdness  correspond  to  the
modes of being of that which is merely possible (i.e. qualities), that which is actual (i.e.
existents),  and that which is general (i.e. laws),  respectively. This is the reason why
Peirce argued that “there must be three categories of things: first, those which are such
as they are regardless of anything else, like the living consciousness of a given kind of
feeling,  say  of  red  ;  secondly,  those  which  are  such as  they  are  by  virtue  of  their
relation to  other things,  regardless  of  any third things,  which is  the case with the
existence of all bodies, whose reality consists in their acting on each other, in pairs;
thirdly, those which are such as they are by virtue of bringing two others into relation,
as signs of  all  sorts  are [e.g. thoughts of  laws]  such only so far  as  they bring their
significations to bear upon the objects to which they are applied” (EP2: 427 [1907]). As it
is now clear, those three categories of “things” are the three categories of real elements
constitutive of a “triune Reality,” in so far as “the being of the quality lies wholly in
itself, the being of the [existent] thing lies in opposition to other [existent] things, the
being of the reason [i.e. laws,  in so far as they are represented] lies in its  bringing
qualities and things together” (CP 1.515 [ca. 1896]). 
23 Now, we have seen that each kind of real elements are phenomenologically apprehended
through three different states of mind: our feelings are feelings of qualities, our reactions
are reactions of existents, and our reasoning in thoughts are thoughts of laws. However,
the fact that these elements are necessarily relative to mind does not imply that they
may not be real, that is, be such as they are, independently of what any particular mind
or minds may think (or represent) them to be. This highlights an important feature of
Peirce’s objective idealism: namely, if “all our knowledge is, and forever must be, relative
to human experience and to the nature of the human mind” (CP 6.95 [1903]), it remains
that “all experience and all knowledge is knowledge of that which is, independently of
being represented.”11 
24 Remind indeed  that  Peirce’s  defense  of  a  triune  reality  lies  in  this  fact  “which  all
ordinary people will see plainly enough; that the essence of the realist’s opinion is that
it is one thing to be and another thing to be represented” (CP 8.129 [1902]). This, as we
have seen, explains why Peirce was for instance “confident that the bull and I feel much
alike at the sight of a red rag” (EP2: 192 [1903]); that if “a man [walks] down Wall Street
debating within himself  the existence of  an external  world [and]  jostles  up against
somebody who angrily draws off and knocks him down, the sceptic is unlikely to carry
his skepticism so far as to doubt whether anything beside the ego was concerned” (CP
1.431 [ca. 1896]); and that if “we admit that the law has a real being, […] then the future
necessary consequent of a present state of things is as real and true as that present
state of things itself” (CP 6.368 [1902]). 
25 Hence,  whether  it  be  an  unrepresented  and  unembodied  possible  quality,  an
unrepresented and reacting actual existent, or a necessarily represented law according
to which a future state of things may be predicted, all three kinds of elements may be
deemed as real. 
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3. Representing the Real World
26 Now, as planned, let us see how the three kinds of elements must be recognized at once
in true propositions, taking one of Peirce’s canonical examples as an illustration: the
hardness of a diamond. 
 
3.1. “This Diamond is Hard”
27 If one wishes to represent that a particular diamond really is hard, for instance, one has
indeed to recognize the reality of all three kinds of elements. In the first place, one has
to admit the reality of hardness, as a possible quality being such as it is whether it be
embodied or not and represented or not. Hardness is a first and its mode of being is a
mere positive qualitative possibility (distinguishable from, say, softness). In the second
place,  one  has  to  admit  the  reality  of  the  (supposedly  hard)  diamond,  an  insistent
existent thing brutely acting upon other things and upon my senses in such wise that it
is  actually capable of  determining the very representation that is  to be made of it,
whether  that  representation,  at  this  stage,  be  true  or  not.  This  (supposedly  hard)
diamond is a second and its mode of being is a reactive actuality. Finally, in the third
place, one has to admit the reality of the law according to which something hard would
behave if it really were hard. A law is a third and its mode of being is that of a general
necessity. 
28 Now, that which is purposed to represent an object as it really is, that is, as being such
as it is, independently of its being represented, is a general propositional sign. It happens
indeed that  such a  general  sign,  once  instantiated in  context,  may be  interpreted as
representing (a) the existent object to which the proposition is actually related (e.g. a
diamond), (b) the possible character which is supposedly possessed by its object (e.g.
hardness), and (c) the actual relation which is said to really subsist between the object
and the professed character. As it turns out, the object is indicated by a proposition’s
subject-part,  the possible character is  signified by its predicate-part,  and the actual
relation between the two is expressed by the very “co-localization” of the two parts
(Stjernfelt,  2014,  2015).  A  general  proposition,  once  instantiated in  context,  is  thus
purposed to signify a fact about an object: for instance, the actual fact that hardness is
embodied by this singular diamond, to which the proposition is itself related, and to
which it applies. 
29 More technically, propositions are meant to be asserted in context. A proposition does
indeed profess to be virtually true, but a same proposition can actually be used in both
fictive  and  veridictive  discourse.  Therefore,  there  has  got  to  be  “something  more”
differentiating the two kinds of usage. Peirce identified it as an act of assertion: “an act
of assertion supposes that, a proposition being formulated, a person performs an act
which renders him liable to the penalties of the social law (or, at any rate, those of the
moral law) in case it should not be true, unless he has a definite and sufficient excuse”
12 (EP2: 278 [1903]). Only such a conventional act may distinguish between a proposition
which renders its enunciator “responsible for its truth” (CP 5.543 [ca. 1902]) and one
that does not.13 However, in so far as “that which any true proposition asserts14 is real,
in the sense of being as it is regardless of what you or I may think [i.e. represent] about
it” (EP2:  343  [1905]),  it  remains  to  be  seen  how we  can  be  so  sure  that  a  general
proposition really conforms to the singular fact which it is purposed to represent? In
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other words,  in so far  as  “truth is  the correspondence of  a  representation with its
object”  (EP2:  379  [1906]),  how  can  we  be  so  sure  that  a  general  proposition,  once
instantiated and asserted in context, is true of its object?15 
 
3.2. The Truthfulness of Propositions
30 The answer, said Peirce, lies in the “application of the sole principle of logic which was
recommended by Jesus; ‘Ye may know them by their fruits’” (CP 5.402n2 [1878]). It lies
in the future. Here is Peirce’s argument, which I develop following up on the previous
example.  The  peculiar  instantiated  proposition,  by  means  of  which  an  enunciator
asserts that a given diamond is hard, may only be conceived to truly conform to the
(supposedly real) fact that it embodies hardness if and only if that diamond would act
like the hard thing it is represented to be: for instance, if the diamond really is hard,
then it would resist an attempt to leave a mark, if scratched: “Take any general term
whatever. I say of a stone that it is hard. That means that so long as the stone remains
hard, every essay to scratch it by the moderate pressure of a knife will surely fail. To
call the stone hard is to predict that no matter how often you try the experiment, it will
fail every time. That innumerable series of conditional predictions is involved in the
meaning  of  this  lowly  adjective”  (EP2:  254  [1903]).  Accordingly,  the  truth  of  a
proposition  necessarily  hinges  upon  the  future  actualization  of  the  conditional
predictions implied by its predicate, as they may be stated by means of an argument.
This amounts to saying that the truth of a proposition hinges upon the real government
of  the  possible  laws  by  means  of  which  its  object  is  presumably  determined  and
affected. Corollarily, the falsity of a proposition hinges upon the possible discrepancies
between expected results (as theoretically predicted by a law) and the ones ultimately
taking place in actual fact, by means of experimentation. Errors and doubt may thus be
forced upon us, whether we like it or not. 
31 This overall argumentation, of course, expresses Peirce’s pragmaticist doctrine, as it was
clearly defined in 1907: “that the total meaning of the predication of an intellectual
concept consists in affirming that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind,
the subject of the predication would (or would not) behave in a certain way, – that is,
that it either would, or would not, be true that under given experiential circumstances
[…] certain facts would exist, – that proposition I take to be the kernel of pragmatism.16
More simply stated, the whole meaning of an intellectual predicate is that certain kinds
of events would happen […] under certain kinds of existential circumstances” (EP2: 401
[1907]).  In short,  Peirce’s  position thus forces us to recognize that  the only way to
admit that general propositions may ever be conceived to be true of particular objects –
which we certainly do all the time – is to recognize that those objects may possibly be
governed by real laws.17 All in all, therefore, truthfulness requires a recognition of all
three real elements: real qualities, real existents, and real laws. 
 
3.3. The Role of Inquiry 
32 Naturally, in the course of life, we do not test the truthfulness of asserted propositions
by means of controlled experiments (although we might always do it in principle): we
rely  instead  on  the  good  faith  of  their  enunciators  and  act  instead  upon  beliefs,
understood following Scottish philosopher Alexander Bain’s definition as “that upon
which a man is prepared to act” (EP2: 399 [1907]):  “to assert a predicate of certain
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subjects […] means, – intends, – only to create a belief that the real things denoted by
those subjects possess the real character or relation signified by the predicate”18 (EP2:
427 [1907]). 
33 However, the testing of the truthfulness of propositions, by means of experimentation,
does happen to be the norm of scientific inquiries. According to Peirce, the scientific
method (next to that of tenacity, authority, and a priori) is indeed the most successful
one for settling opinion, or “fixing belief,” which is an incessant hope animating the
scientific  community.  More  precisely,  a  scientist’s  business  is  to  test  the  reality  of
hypothesized laws, or general principles, whose possible government could explain a
peculiar kind of phenomena. Hence, the possibility of real governing laws becomes an
indispensable postulate of scientific inquiry as well, just as a faith in the intelligibility of
the world is an ethical imperative for scientists. Once possible laws are guessed, they
may be subsequently tested by means of experiments and, if confirmed, constitute the
basis for predictions. If they are not confirmed, however, new batteries of hypotheses
will have to be submitted, and opinions will have to be revised19). 
34 It follows that, in general, a scientific truth constitutes a belief to which a sufficiently
carried inquiry is ultimately predestined to lead, and that the real becomes precisely
that which a final belief shall ultimately represent. And because scientists necessarily
err in their particular inquiries, the real is indeed that which “has such characters as it
has independently of what any particular mind or minds may think those characters may be”
(EP2:  532  [1903];  our  emphasis):  one  thought,  or  even  more,  may  be  wrong,  but
countless  thoughts  that  are  carried  sufficiently  far are  logically  destined to  be  right.
Peirce  thus  argued  that “the  different  sciences  deal  with  different  kinds  of  truth;
mathematical truth is one thing, ethical truth is another, the actually existing state of
the universe is a third; but all these different conceptions have in common something
very marked and clear. We all hope that the different scientific inquiries in which we
are  severally  engaged  are  going  ultimately  to  lead  to  some  definitely  established
conclusion, which conclusion we endeavor to anticipate in some measure. Agreement
with that ultimate proposition that we look forward to, – agreement with that, what it
turns out to be, is the scientific truth” (EP2: 87 [1901]). 
 
Conclusion
35 Somewhere else, having conducted a lexicometric analysis of Peirce’s Collected Papers, I
showed that the two most cited (substantive) terms in those writings were precisely
truth and proposition (Gaspard 2019).  In light of  the present essay,  this  result  is  not
surprising: Peirce’s philosophical interests, an outgrowth of his own background as a
research scientist, do seem focused on the “logicality” of things. Peirce was thus among
the first systematic thinkers to have connected traditional questions of metaphysics
(see,  for  instance,  his  focus  on  a  list  of  post-kantian  categories,  his  re-reading  of
scholastic realism, his nuanced take on idealism, etc.) with an emerging “philosophy of
science,”  focusing  on  the  logic  of  scientific  inquiry,  and  an  equally  pioneering
“philosophy of logic,” concentrating on relatives and the classification of arguments
(see,  for  instance,  Hookway  (1985)  for  an  overview  of  Peirce’s  architectonics).
Furthermore, his constant appraisal of the nature of reasoning and of representations
in particular, construed as ingredients of thought, has been central to this effort. His
pragmaticism,  of  which  I  strived  to  offer  a  “synoptic”  (hence  necessarily  partial)
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overview in this  article,  is  then purported to  connect  these  views into one unified
system. 
36 Peirce’s reflections, among other things, evolved into an impressive but fragmented
doctrine of signs, that needs to be read in light of this unified and systematic approach.
At the turn of the century, Peirce actually reached the point where he equated Logic
with Semeiotic,  understood as  “the quasi-necessary,  or  formal,  doctrine  of  signs”  in
general  (CP  2.227  [ca.  1897]).  More  specifically,  he  added  that  “by  describing  the
doctrine as ‘quasi-necessary,’ or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such
signs as we know, and from such an observation, […] we are led to statements […] as to
what must be the characters of all signs used by a ‘scientific’ intelligence, that is to say,
by an intelligence capable of learning by experience” (ibid.). As he came to conceive it,
“Logic, considered as Semeiotic” (SS 80 [1908]) was to comprise three branches: pure
grammar, logic proper, and pure rhetoric. The task of pure grammar is to ascertain “what
must be true of the [signs] used by every scientific intelligence in order that they may
embody any meaning” (CP 2.229 [ca. 1897]). The task of logic proper (or critical logic) is
to ascertain “what is quasi-necessarily true of the [signs] of any scientific intelligence
in order that they may hold good of any object, that is, may be true” (ibid.). Finally, the
task of pure rhetoric is to ascertain “the laws by which in every scientific intelligence
one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another” (ibid.).
37 Peirce’s famous trichotomies of signs thus aims at defining the possible kinds of ways
by means of which such a “scientific intelligence” may get to know or represent the
real. For instance, as we have seen, terms (subjects and predicates), propositions, and
arguments  are the  three  kinds  of  symbols,  or  generals  signs,  fit  to  signify,  or  be
interpreted  as  signifying,  possible  characters  (as  predicates),  possible  objects  (as
subjects – with the help of indexical signs), possible facts about objects (as propositions
connecting subjects and predicates), and possible rational connections between facts
about objects (as arguments connecting premises leading to conclusions). In light of
this overview, Peirce’s contention that “the value of a symbol is that it serves to make
thought and conduct rational and enables us to predict the future” (CP 4.448 [ca. 1903])
takes on its full meaning. Following an old trend in Peircean studies, I thus hope this
paper  succeeded  in  showing  that  no  parts  of  his  philosophy shall  be  studied  in
themselves, amputated from the systematic whole to which they belong.
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NOTES
1. As a matter of fact, in an 1892 paper on the critic of arguments published by The Open Court,
Peirce granted that his logical enquiries stood in line with those of Kant and Hegel, in sharing a
similar  affinity  for  triads:  “Kant  taught  that  our  fundamental  conceptions  are  merely  the
ineluctable ideas of a system of logical forms; nor is any occult transcendentalism requisite to
show that this is so, and must be so. […] That there are three elementary forms of categories is
the conclusion of Kant,  to which Hegel subscribes;  and Kant seeks to establish this from the
analysis of formal logic. Unfortunately, his study of that subject was so excessively superficial
that his argument is destitute of the slightest value. Nevertheless, his conclusion is correct; for
the three elements permeate not only the truths of logic, but even to a great extent the very
errors of the profounder logicians” (CP 3.422 [1892]). In his second 1898 Cambridge lecture, he
stated in the same vein: “Why should there be three principles of reasoning, and what have they
to do with one another? This question, which was connected with other parts of my schedule of
philosophical  inquiry that need not be detailed,  now came to the front.  Even without Kant’s
categories, the recurrence of triads in logic was quite marked, and must be the croppings out of
some fundamental conceptions. I now undertook to ascertain what the conceptions were. This
search resulted in what I call my categories” (CP 4.3 [1898]). 
2. Peirce’s conception of the real would broadly remain unchanged throughout his writings. For
instance, in his early review of Fraser’s The Works of George Berkeley, from 1871, he had already
argued that  “objects  [of  representations]  are divided into figments,  dreams,  etc.,  on the one
hand, and realities on the other. The former are those which exist only inasmuch as you or I or
some man imagines them; the latter are those which have an existence independent of your mind
or mine or that of any number of persons” (W2: 467 [1871]). A few years later, in the well-known
How to Make Our Ideas Clear, published in 1878, he suggested that “we may define the real as that
whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be” (W3: 271 [1878]). In
the same vein, in his later years, he came to declare that “we must mean by the real that which
has such characters as it has independently of what any particular mind or minds may think
those characters may be” (EP2: 532 [1903]), and that “to say that a thing is Real is merely to say
that such predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true regardless of whatever any actual
person or persons might think concerning that truth” (EP2: 456 [1909]). In other words, the real
is that which “is unaffected by what we may think of it” (W2: 467 [1871]). Really being is thus
ontologically different from being represented (see, for instance, EP2: 303 [1904] on that matter). 
3. Peirce actually took no prisoners as far as nominalism was concerned. For instance, in one
draft  of  his  1907 rejected letter  on pragmatism to the editors  of  The Nation and The Atlantic
Monthly, he lamented that “the nominalistic color which an apparent accident made ascendant
even to this day throughout European philosophy is merely that perversion of pragmatism which
consists in denying any other mode of real being than existence” (R 320:18 [ca. 1907]). This led
him to  conclude  that  “all  modern  philosophy  of  every  sect  has  been  nominalistic”  (CP  1.19
[1903]). 
4. Thus, because a quality is not “dependent, in its being, upon the fact that some material thing
possesses  it”  (CP  1.422  [ca.  1896]),  “the  error  of  [the  nominalists]  lies  in  holding  that  the
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potential, or possible, is nothing but what the actual makes it to be” (ibid.). Similarly, another
error would consist in rightfully recognizing that “all colors are relative to the sense of sight” but
failing to notice that “there is a difference between a color and a sensation of color. For a color is
a quality of a thing which remains the same whether it be exposed to one kind of illumination or
to another,  and whether it  be seen by a normal or by a  color-blind.  Such is  the established
signification of the word ‘color’” (CP 6.327 [1909]). As a matter of fact, two things could not be
thought of as alike were it not for some real quality which would happen to be possessed by the
two things compared.
5. In an unidentified fragment, Peirce thus reminded that the word actual “is due to Aristotle’s
use of ενέργεια, action, to mean existence, as opposed to a mere germinal state” (CP 1.325 [n.d.]).
6. According to Peirce, a “prescission,” being one of the three grades of mental separation with
discrimination and dissociation, “consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is
present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other” (EP2: 270 [1903]).
In other words, that which is “prescinded” is that which cannot be dissociated from something
else but which may still be supposed, or conceived, to be separate from that something else. In
other  words,  that  which  is  prescinded  is  that  which  may  be  focused  on,  to  the  neglect  of
something else (cf. W2: 50 [1867]). 
7. Taking an inkstand as an example, Peirce described its existence in the following terms: “If I
turn away my eyes, other witnesses will tell me that it still remains. If we all leave the room and
dismiss the matter from our thoughts, still a photographic camera would show the inkstand still
there,  with  the  same roundness,  polish  and  transparency,  and  with  the  same opaque  liquid
within. Thus, or otherwise, I confirm myself in the opinion that its characters are what they are,
and persist at every opportunity in revealing themselves, regardless of what you, or I, or any
man, or generation of men, may think that they are.  That conclusion to which I  find myself
driven,  struggle  against  it  as  I  may,  I  briefly  express  by  saying  that  the  inkstand  is  a  real
[existent] thing” (EP2: 62 [1901]). In a draft review of Karl Pearson’s Grammar of Science, Peirce
suggested along the way that “there is a blind force about the inkstand by which it crowds its
way into our universe in spite of all we can do” (CP 8.153 [ca. 1900]). 
8. Regarding predictions, Peirce argued in one of his 1903 Lowell Lectures that “five minutes of
our waking life will hardly pass without our making some kind of prediction; and in the majority
of cases these predictions are fulfilled in the event. […] To say that a prediction has a decided
tendency to be fulfilled, is to say that the future events are in a measure really governed by a law.
[…] If the prediction has a tendency to be fulfilled, it must be that future events have a tendency
to conform to a general rule” (CP 1.26 [1903]). In defining uniformity for the Baldwin’s Dictionary,
Peirce explained the problem in these other terms: “If I have tried the experiment with a million
stones and have found that every one of them fell when allowed to drop, it may be very natural
for me to believe that almost any stone will act in the same way. But if it can be proved that there
is no real connection between the behaviour of different stones, then there is nothing for it but
to say that it was a chance coincidence that those million stones all behaved in the same way; for
if  there was any reason for it,  and they really dropped, there was a real  reason,  that is,  a real
general [law]. Now if it is mere chance that they all dropped, that affords no more reason for
supposing that the next will drop than my throwing three double sixes successively with a pair of
dice  is  a  reason  for  thinking  that  the  next  throw  will  be  double  sixes”  (CP  6.99  [1902]).
Accordingly,  the  possibility of  conditional  prediction is  what  differentiates  the  coincidental
regularity of a chance succession from the regularity of a real, governing law. 
9. It is indeed equivalent to say that “all stones fall” and to say that “if x is a stone and x is
dropped, then x would fall.”
10. Here again, then, a choice between nominalism and realism had to be done in so far as a “law
[may be] distinguished from brute fact, either, as the nominalists say, by being a product of the
human mind [i.e. a representation], or, as the realists say, by being a real intellectual ingredient
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of the universe” (EP2: 425 [1907]). Of course, the second alternative was the one decidedly chosen
by Peirce: “My argument to show that law is reality and not figment – is nature independently of
any connivance of ours – is that predictions are verified” (CP 8.153 [ca. 1900]). Over time, there
remained  for  him  to  conclude  that  “after  physical  science  has  discovered  so  many  general
principles in Nature, nominalism becomes a disgraceful habitude of thought” (CP 6.175 [1906]).
11. When absolute idealists would conclude that metaphysical conceptions, because they “repose
upon their being involved in the forms of logic, are only valid for experience and since all our
knowledge is relative to human mind, […] are not valid for things as they objectively are” (CP 6.95
[1903]). As a matter of fact, however, “even lies invariably contain this much truth, that they
represent themselves to be referring to something whose mode of being is independent of its
being represented.” On this important balance in Peirce’s thought between realism and idealism,
see the recently published book by Lane (2018). 
12. That an act of assertion renders its enunciator “liable to the penalties of the social law” is
rendered explicit in the taking of an oath: “If a man desires to assert anything very solemnly, he
takes such steps as will enable him to go before a magistrate or notary and take a binding oath to
it.  Taking  an  oath  is  not  mainly  an  event  of  the  nature  of  a  setting  forth,  Vorstellung,  or
representing. It is not mere saying, but is doing. The law, I believe, calls it an ‘act.’ At any rate, it
would be followed by very real effects, in case the substance of what is asserted should be proved
untrue.  This  ingredient,  the  assuming  of  responsibility,  which  is  so  prominent  in  solemn
assertion, must be present in every genuine assertion. For clearly, every assertion involves an
effort  to  make the intended interpreter  believe what  is  asserted,  to  which end a  reason for
believing it must be furnished” (CP 5.546 [ca. 1908]). 
13. As it is here evidenced, Peirce was thus a major precursor of modern pragmatics, a historical
fact now widely recognized (see, for instance, Réthoré 1993; Bergman 2009a & 2009b; Boyd &
Heney 2017;  and Bellucci  2018).  Regarding fiction in particular,  Peirce posited that  “the real
world  cannot  be  distinguished from a  fictitious  world  by  any  description.  It  has  often  been
disputed whether Hamlet was mad or not. This exemplifies the necessity of indicating that the
real world is meant, if it be meant. […] It is true that no language (so far as I know) has any
particular form of speech to show that the real world is spoken of. But that is not necessary, since
tones and looks are sufficient to show when the speaker is in earnest. These tones and looks act
dynamically upon the listener, and cause him to attend to realities” (CP 2.337 [ca. 1895]). 
14. Here, Peirce misuses language, for it is not the proposition in itself which asserts something
but the proposition as it is used in an act of assertion. 
15. Note that propositions are the only kind of (general) signs which may possibly be true or false 
of  their  object,  while  their  predicates  and  subjects,  by  themselves,  may  be  neither.  Indeed,
predicates, if they do signify possible characters, do not indicate the actual existents to which
they  may  belong,  and  subjects,  if  they  do  indicate  existents,  do  not  explicitly  signify  their
character. Accordingly, no subject or predicate can ever be used to assert anything by themselves,
while a proposition can.
16. Peirce actually coined the term pragmaticism to differentiate his own kind of pragmatism
from other kinds which he did not entirely condone. Nevertheless, Peirce still  used the term
pragmatism in numerous places. 
17. Note that the truth of propositions may also hinge upon socially established laws. For instance,
someone may be truly represented as “king” in so far as “certain conditional rules shall govern
the conduct” of the “king” and its subjects accordingly. But if the king’s subjects (e.g. civil society,
the military,  etc.)  fall  short  of  implementing those conditional  rules,  the king then becomes
instantly stripped of his clothes. This explains why social realities may collapse at once: real social
laws are indeed less crystallized than real natural laws, the former losing their governing power
more easily than the latter.
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18. Note that a symbolic predicate may represent any kind of character, not only qualities. Peirce
distinguishes indeed between monadic (e.g. “is blue”), dyadic (e.g. “kills”), and polyadic characters
(e.g. “gives to”). That characters may concern more than one subject does not contradict the logic
of what is stated above. However, Peirce insisted that polyadic characters could not be conceived
as belonging to a subject independently of its being represented as belonging to that subject by
means of a general predicate. For instance, John does not give a gift to Paul independently of John
being represented as doing so. This is because “giving” is not immediately observable like “killing”
is. Indeed, an act of giving consists in the instantiation of a necessarily represented law (i.e. the
socially  instituted  “law  of  giving”),  and  whose  real  government  may  only  be  verified  if
conditional predictions based on it are actually borne out by future events. Said Peirce: “If A
gives B to C, he, A, acts upon B, and acts upon C; and B acts upon C. Perhaps, for example, he lays
down B, whereupon C takes B up, and is benefited by A. But these three acts might take place
without that essentially intellectual operation of transferring the legal right of possession, which
axiomatically cannot be brought about by any pure dyadic relationships whatsoever” (CP 6.323
[1909]). It follows that “the mere transfer of an object which A sets down and C takes up does not
constitute giving. There must be a transfer of ownership and ownership is a matter of Law” (EP2:
171 [1903]) – it implies that “certain conditional rules shall govern the conduct of A and of C” (CP
1.475 [1896]). On the other hand, that an actual existent embodies a quality or that two existents
react against each other do not have to be represented as such in order to be phenomenologically
apprehended:  those monadic and dyadic characters are immediately given in perception (i.e.
through feelings  and senses  of  reaction,  respectively)  and,  as  such,  are  constitutive  of  their
respective kind of dyadic (perceptual) fact. This brings a division of facts distinguishing between
monadic, dyadic, and polyadic facts, the latter being necessarily “intellectual” or “mental,” that
is, dependent on thought and representation. 
19. For a more thorough account of Peirce’s logic of scientific inquiry, see Wiggins (2004) and
Rodrigues (2011). 
ABSTRACTS
This essay attempts an overview of Peirce’s pragmaticist doctrine of the truth of propositions.
Relying on his writings, I try to characterize his conception of the real and discuss the ways in
which his peculiar scholastic metaphysics, opposing that of nominalists, is a central tenet of the
pragmaticist view of truth which he strived to develop. Peirce conceived indeed real possibilities
and real necessities to be just as real as actualities, those realities corresponding in nature to
qualities (“firsts”), laws (“thirds”), and existents (“seconds”), respectively. More specifically, I
detail the peculiar mode of being of each kind of real elements and show that all three categories
must be recognized at once in true propositions. This led Peirce to conclude that if propositions
are  general  signs  indeed  and,  as  such,  along  with  terms  and  arguments,  are  necessarily
dependent on mind, it does not in the least preclude those propositions to be about, nor true of, a
real world – a position which actually constitutes a necessary prerequisite for any meaningful
conception of scientific inquiry. I believe that a focus on such interrelations between Peirce’s
categorial account of the real and Peirce’s pragmaticist conception of truth constitutes an ideal
testament  to  the  systematic  nature  of  his  thought,  which  is  an  aspect  often  deflated  in
unspecialized literatures. 
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